Protocols may become just another non-binding document

PanARMENIAN.Net - It is still difficult to say what Armenia gained as a result of signing. But now the most interesting question is what gained Turkey and the mediator countries. It is unlikely that after signing of documents the process of Turkey's integration into the EU should pick up speed. The same is true about the settlement of Karabakh conflict, the main obstacle to implementation of the Protocols. Even if the parliaments of the two countries ratify the Protocols, this process may take 2-3 months, and there is no guarantee that the normalization of relations will proceed along the already fixed path. The "road map" that has been spoken about since April of the current year, is not ready yet and will not be ready until Ankara manages to include in it the preconditions she was not able to include in the Protocols. And if the Armenian Genocide is a minor issue to the Turkish side and can be "successfully" dragged out with the commission of historians, which will not be formed due to rejection from the Armenian side, the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict could be the sticking point for the Turkish opposition, and, under its pressure, for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), this issue being the main obstacle to establishing diplomatic relations. By the way, that's exactly what no one speaks about; everyone is talking only about the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border, which, by the way, has never functioned fully. The story began back in Soviet times, when Turkey, then a NATO member, posed a real threat to the southern borders of the Soviet Union. In 1980, before the Moscow Olympics they began to raise a customs office at the border, but it remained unfinished. A checkpoint at the bridge over the Araks River opened only twice: in 1988 during the Spitak earthquake, when via Turkey Armenia received humanitarian assistance and in 1990, when the UN mission visited Armenia. Since then, the border has been closed.

The land border between the USSR and Turkey was 618 kilometers, and its Armenian section of 330 kilometers was not of a great importance. Much more attention of Moscow drew the maritime boundary in Batumi, through which people tried to escape from the USSR. Moreover, in 1931 Turkey conceived then rather weak Iran to accept some parts of the Turkish-Iranian border in exchange for the 11-mile corridor that allowed Turkey to gain direct access to Nakhichevan, i.e. to Azerbaijan. It was then that foundation was laid for the expansion of Turkey into Azerbaijan, which decades later developed into Heydar Aliyev's slogan ":One nation, two states", allowing it to intervene into the Karabakh conflict. In principle, the position of Ankara in this issue is obviously destined to failure, no matter how hard the U.S. and Europe try to convince Turkey of the contrary. For some reason immediately after signing of the Protocols Russia came to believe that the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations should proceed simultaneously with the Karabakh conflict settlement, but hardly can this be considered the official view of Moscow. Russia's policy in the Caucasus is still vague and it leads to nothing but confusion. It can be said that the statement of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the impossibility of opening the border without regulation of the Karabakh problem, put off the process of normalization of relations for an indefinite time. Such statements, made to please Baku and, why not, under her pressure, could lead to a stalemate in the region. It is difficult to convince Karabakh-focused Baku that the Armenian issue is not most important for Ankara. Now on the agenda are the Kurdish issue and the Cyprus problem. And only then, time permitting, Ankara will settle relations with Armenia, renouncing its ties with Azerbaijan. Otherwise, nothing will happen. It is unlikely that Turkish politicians, including Deniz Baykal and other opposition figures, should not realize the point. There is a third, the most effective and decisive force - the Turkish General Staff. If it sets a priority for Turkey, it is definite to be accepted by the government. In this country the army still has the last word.