Settlement of the Karabakh conflict is almost at a standstill, and attempts of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries to somehow set the process going result in declarations at the best. Well, no other variant could be expected as the two sides are diametrically opposed and in the near future, as we have been repeatedly saying, progress is definitely not foreseen. It's hard to judge whether this is good or bad, but if the improbable happens and NKR sits round the table of negotiations as a full participant, then indeed we can speak of a breakthrough. Another advantage was that the presidents refrained from signing a “Meindorf-2”, for it is clear that no declaration can force to sign a framework agreement on Karabakh. Nor is realistic the timing of an agreement defined by OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair of Russia Yuri Merzlyakov. According to him, the parties have been given 2 weeks to agree on the basic principles of conflict regulation, which is simply impossible by definition. In short, as far as the Karabakh conflict settlement is concerned, the year of 2010 will be like that of 2009.

In this regard it should be noted that last week according to Dmitry Medvedev’s presidential decree there was set up the North Caucasus Federal District, designed to naturally strengthen Moscow’s position in the highly volatile region. On the whole, the positions of the two sides can be described as follows: Russia, as an OSCE Minsk Group co-chair country, is interested in temporary holdup of war over Karabakh because she needs to further strengthen her position. The USA and EU in the person of France will not hinder Moscow, as they need her as a transit route to Afghanistan. As far as Turkey and Iran are concerned, their positions are already defined: they cannot influence the adoption of any solution to the Karabakh problem, neither will they be allowed to hinder. And again we come to the conclusion that it is especially Moscow that will not allow it, reasoning from mutual benefit: both Turkey and Iran are now in need of Russia’s support. Strained Turkish-Israeli relations ban be settled with the help of Moscow, not to mention Iran’s nuclear program. Moreover, the increasing activity of Turkey in regional affairs may, oddly enough, harm Azerbaijan, because in this case, the countries concerned will adhere to a uniform policy, and Ankara, with his open support for Baku and obvious aversion to Armenia, can be driven into a corner. Iran’s policy in this issue is much balanced: Tehran just wants to “help to regulate the conflict as a disinterested party”. And, most likely, if the time comes, Tehran will be given preference (as compared to Ankara).

And it turns out that only very serious events taking place far from the Caucasus can shake or knock Russia out of the region. Where and what it might be is not yet clear; it may depend on the outcome of elections in the Ukraine, on Belarus, on anything. Thus far everything is quiet. But this quietness may explode if Baku suddenly decides to launch a war. However, at the current stage of negotiations the most essential thing for Baku is that Karabakh not be a legally recognized state, as it would deprive Baku of the chance to launch military action, even if a window of opportunity turns up.