Progress in the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan is largely attributed to Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s persistence, according to Thomas de Waal, a senior analyst at the Carnegie Foundation.
In his article on the peace agreement, de Waal noted that Pashinyan made significant concessions, accepting Baku’s proposals on two previously unresolved provisions.
De Waal emphasized that the document concerns the regulation of interstate relations rather than societal reconciliation.
The expert pointed out that Azerbaijani officials have openly stated they are in no hurry to sign the agreement, believing it benefits Armenia more than Azerbaijan. At the same time, he argued that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev continues to use the conflict as a tool to consolidate his country, according to Jam-news.
De Waal outlined several steps to ensure that the “moment for peace” is not missed. While Brussels and Washington could take a more active stance, he stressed that Turkey plays the most crucial role. Turkish officials, he noted, understand that the current window of opportunity with Pashinyan may close. In his view, the Armenian prime minister’s initiatives should receive a more positive response from Turkey.
“It is undoubtedly time to be bolder and announce steps that will boost economic ties with Armenia and provide certain benefits to Pashinyan’s government, even if the Armenian-Turkish border is not fully opened,” de Waal wrote.
The expert considers this a significant step toward stability in the South Caucasus but asserts that additional measures are needed for full peace.
According to him, the international context is particularly important. While Moscow and Washington focus on Ukraine’s future, there are concerns in Armenia that once Russia is relieved of its wartime burdens, it "might again turn its aggressive gaze toward the South Caucasus. In this context, reaching a principled agreement on the peace treaty reduces Moscow’s chances of interference."
De Waal also pointed out that the document lacks components typically found in historic peace agreements, such as justice mechanisms for war crimes or explicit guarantees for the return of displaced persons.
He recalled that the key issue of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict— the future of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian population— has effectively been resolved through force. In September 2023, Azerbaijan established control over the region, leading to the exodus of 100,000 Armenians. Pashinyan has acknowledged that the region is now part of Azerbaijan and does not expect former residents to return in the near future.
De Waal has noted that Azerbaijan considers changes to Armenia’s constitution a crucial precondition for achieving a final peace agreement. Baku argues that references in Armenia’s constitutional preamble to the 1990 Declaration of Independence—which in turn cites the 1989 resolution on the unification of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh—constitute a hidden territorial claim and must be removed.
According to de Waal, this issue could be resolved through creative diplomacy, particularly given that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan plans to draft a new constitution after the 2026 parliamentary elections. However, he believes Pashinyan has already made significant concessions and now has limited political resources. The Armenian leader wants to enter the elections with a peace agreement in hand rather than be seen as merely making concessions to Azerbaijan, as his opponents claim.
De Waal pointed out that the stronger Azerbaijan’s pressure on constitutional changes, the harder it will be for Pashinyan to present the peace process as an achievement. He added that the Armenian prime minister frames this decision as a fundamental philosophical choice for Armenian society—between the "Real Armenia" and the "Historic Armenia." "Pashinyan urges citizens to acknowledge that, following the military defeats of 2020 and 2023, Armenia must adapt to the new reality, normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, strengthen ties with Europe, and reduce dependence on Russia."
Many forces, including opposition groups, parts of the Armenian diaspora, and Russia, have sought to derail Pashinyan’s initiatives.
"Many want him [Pashinyan] to fail—opposition groups, Armenian diaspora organizations, and Russia. Azerbaijan is also not making things easier. Azerbaijani officials openly state that they are in no rush [to sign the agreement] and believe that a peace deal would benefit Armenia more than Azerbaijan. President Ilham Aliyev has never publicly spoken about the benefits of peace or said anything positive about Pashinyan. The conflict with Armenia remains a key tool for maintaining control over his country. Just hours before Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry announced progress in negotiations, Aliyev delivered an aggressive speech, reiterating his long-standing maximalist demands, grievances, and accusations against Armenia."
On March 13, Armenia’s Foreign Ministry announced that it had accepted Azerbaijan’s proposals on the two previously unresolved articles of the peace agreement, making the treaty ready for signing. Yerevan stated it is now prepared to discuss the timing and venue for the signing. However, Baku has set new preconditions and declared that it is still too early to discuss meeting dates.
The draft peace agreement consists of 17 points, 15 of which had already been agreed upon. The two remaining disputes involved renouncing mutual claims at the international level and preventing foreign representatives from being stationed at the Armenia-Azerbaijan border.
